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The following essay takes the topic of this special issue as an opportunity to not just in-
vestigate Deleuze’s “Postscript on Control Societies,” but to look more generally at the 
text’s place within his work as a whole. Indeed, as various authors have observed, there 
are a number of aspects that clearly distinguish the essay from the bulk of Deleuze’s oth-
er writings. First, what the Postscript aims at is a very direct and immediate “diagnosis 
of the present” (Foucault 1999: 91). Despite its brevity, the essay therefore entails a 
wide-ranging account of the (social, economic, cultural, and technological) ‘system’ 
which was about to take hold when Deleuze wrote the essay (1990) – and which still 
seems pervasive today. Second, the Postscript represents one of the few instances where 
Deleuze addresses new media, the digital, cyberspace, and computers: technologies, that 
is, which in the last few decades have thoroughly transformed the world we live in (cf. 
Galloway 2012). Third, while Deleuze is usually considered to be a thinker of affirmative 
creation and a joyous politics of difference and becoming, the Postscript may be the text 
that most evidently lends itself to discovering not only a more contemporary, but also a 
somewhat ‘darker’ Deleuze (cf. Culp 2016). For although it underlines the necessity of 
“finding new weapons” and developing “new forms of resistance” – pointing out that the 
question is not “whether the old or new system is harsher or more bearable” (Deleuze 
1995: 178) – one can argue that the Postscript’s general perspective and tone is in fact 
more bleak and pessimistic than most of Deleuze’s other writings. As Alexander Gallo-
way puts it: “One of the most influential aspects of the ‘Postscript’ […] is how it asserts 
so trenchantly that things are not getting any better. Computers are a curse not a pana-
cea. Planetary neoliberalism is a boondoggle not a deliverance. The snake is even worse 
than the mole” (2012: 515).  
 In what follows, I will approach the Postscript’s distinctiveness within Deleuze’s 
oeuvre via the notion of neoliberalism (to whose ‘planetary’ dimension Galloway rightly 
draws attention here). Obviously, Deleuze does not use this term, neither in the Post-
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script nor, it seems, anywhere else.1 Yet, even a cursory glance through the essay reveals 
that the concept of ‘control society’ bears striking similarities to what is nowadays 
commonly referred to as the neoliberal era or the post-Fordist mode of production.2 My 
essay’s intention, however, is not simply to establish Deleuze as just one more critic of 
neoliberalism. Rather, my argument is that the rise of neoliberalism – or what the Post-
script refers to as a “mutation of capitalism” (Deleuze 1995: 180) – constituted a prob-
lem for Deleuze that gradually forced him to modify parts of his philosophy since the 
late 1970s. Although this shift has so far hardly been discussed, I argue that it is already 
visible in A Thousand Plateaus (1980), reaching its peak in the ‘Control Societies’ essay 
in 1990. 
 My reading of Deleuze, then, is admittedly less ‘Deleuzian’ in character than it is in-
spired by Fredric Jameson’s imperative to ‘always historicize’ (Jameson 2002: ix). I am 
convinced, however, that this way of approaching Deleuze is not only helpful in deter-
mining the political usefulness of Deleuzian theory in the context of today’s global capi-
talism; it also highlights the actual ‘becoming’ of Deleuze’s philosophy. Deleuze’s work, I 
argue, should not be qualified as a unified corpus of abstract ontological ideas and prin-
ciples, but with regard to its effectiveness in responding to concrete developments and 
prevailing challenges – “problems,” as Deleuze and Guattari write in What Is Philosophy?, 
“that necessarily change” (1994: 28). In the first part of this essay, I will discuss the rela-
tionship between Deleuze and neoliberalism with regard to various accusations, accord-
ing to which Deleuze (or at least a version of Deleuzian theory) is ‘complicit’ with ne-
oliberal beliefs and the ideology of the new capitalism. In the second part, I will concen-
trate on the period from Anti-Oedipus (1972) to A Thousand Plateaus (1980), seeking to 
demonstrate that Deleuze and Guattari modified parts of their philosophy in view of the 
rise of neoliberalism in the late 1970s. In the third part, I will finally investigate neolib-
eralism’s ‘absent presence’ in the “Postscript on Control Societies,” discussing the way in 
which the essay diverts from Deleuze’s earlier work. 
 
Deleuze, the Ideologist of Late Capitalism?  
To most Deleuzians, there is probably nothing ambiguous or controversial about the re-
lationship between Deleuze and neoliberalism.3 For although Deleuze never used the 
term in his work, it nevertheless seems evident that the type of society he so ferociously 
                                                        
1 This distinguishes Deleuze from Foucault, who used the term already in the late 1970s, particularly in his 
lectures at the Collège de France (cf. Foucault 2008). 
2 Cf. Flaxman 2012: 283: “Deleuze never used the term ‘neoliberalism,’ but if he had, he surely would have 
done so in the context of control, which describes the emergent, post-Fordist social diagram of contempo-
rary Western societies.” 
3 As an example, cf. Marc Rölli’s essay in this special issue.  
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attacks in the Postscript precisely corresponds to what political scientists, social theo-
rists, and critical economists nowadays refer to under the rubric of neoliberalism.4 
Moreover, Deleuze explicitly stated in 1990 (in an interview with Toni Negri) that he 
and Félix Guattari always “have remained Marxists” (Deleuze 1995: 171). By the end of 
his life, he even planned to write a book about Marx, something which led Fredric Jame-
son to assert “that Deleuze is alone among the great thinkers of so-called poststructural-
ism in having accorded Marx an absolutely fundamental role in his philosophy – in hav-
ing found in the encounter with Marx the most energizing event for his later work” 
(2010: 183).5 
What the following examples confirm, however, is that there are other views as well. 
As with Foucault, whose thinking has been criticized for having “paradoxically func-
tioned to legitimate a neoliberal common sense” (Zamora 2016: 4), the merits of De-
leuze’s philosophy have been called into question from an anti-capitalist or Marxist 
standpoint too. A case in point is the much-quoted statement by Slavoj Žižek that there 
“are, effectively, features that justify calling Deleuze the ideologist of late capitalism” 
(2004: 183-84). While Žižek sees resonances between Deleuze’s Spinozism – his valori-
zation of ‘impersonal affects’ and ‘intensities’6 – and the cultural-economic logic of late 
capitalism, Douglas Spencer claims that the neoliberal architecture of the last few dec-
ades has been significantly influenced by a discursive appropriation of Deleuzian con-
cepts and ideas.7 Along similar lines, Nigel Thrift has observed that a Deleuzian notion of 
“political economy as composed of a series of modulations is not without its ironies,” 
since “it increasingly resembles capitalism’s description of itself” (2005: 4). Likewise, 
Dany-Robert Dufour has argued that what  
Deleuze failed to see was that, far from making it possible to get beyond capitalism, 
his programme merely predicted its future. It now looks as though the new capital-
ism has learned its Deleuzean lesson well. Commodity flows must indeed circulate 
and they circulate all the better now that the old Freudian subject, with his neuro-
ses and the failed identifications that always crystallize into rigidly anti-productive 
forms, is being replaced by a being who can be plugged into anything and every-
thing. (2008: 11) 
                                                        
4 On the concept, history, and workings of neoliberalism, cf. Harvey 2009, Mirowski 2013, Brown 2015, 
Davies 2017, and Slobodian 2018. For my own perspective, cf. Schleusener 2014, 2017, and 2019. 
5 On the relationship and resonances between Marxism and Deleuze’s philosophy, cf. Thoburn 2003, Read 
2003, Jain 2009, and Choat 2010. 
6 Cf. Žižek 2004: 184: “Is the much celebrated Spinozan imitatio afecti, the impersonal circulation of affects 
bypassing persons, not the very logic of publicity, of video clips, and so forth in which what matters is not 
the message about the product but the intensity of the transmitted affects and perceptions?” 
7 It should thus be noted that Spencer is less critical of Deleuze’s philosophy itself than he is of its appro-
priation in the context of contemporary architecture: “Transcribing Deleuzean (or Deleuzoguattarian) 
concepts such as ‘the fold,’ ‘smooth space’ and ‘faciality’ into a prescriptive repertoire of formal manoeu-
vres, Deleuzism in architecture has proposed […] that it shares with [Deleuze and Guattari’s] oeuvre a 
‘progressive’ and ‘emancipatory’ agenda,” while simultaneously claiming “to have advanced beyond a 
supposedly outmoded and regressive politics of opposition and critique” (2011: 9-10). 
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As one would expect, most of these charges have been repudiated by adherents of 
Deleuze, typically arguing that they are either based on grave misinterpretations of 
Deleuze’s ideas, or that they only apply to “vulgar” simulations of his philosophy (Crock-
ett 2013: 25), but not to its actual content. The problem, however, is a bit more compli-
cated. Of course, none of the above-mentioned critics believes that Deleuze had any real 
political sympathies for authors such as Friedrich Hayek, Ayn Rand, or Milton Friedman. 
Yet, there is another, more legitimate question to be asked, one that is less concerned 
with whether or not we interpret Deleuze’s philosophy as an actual manifestation of a 
pro-capitalist attitude. For neoliberalism is not just a set of policies (entailing privatiza-
tion programs, fiscal austerity, tax cuts for the wealthy, and the deregulation of markets) 
that have been implemented practically everywhere around the globe since the late 
1970s. Rather, if we follow Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s argument, the dominance 
of an economic system like neoliberalism relies on what they call a ‘spirit of capitalism,’ 
meaning the ideological and affective affordances in which one’s “engagement in capital-
ism” is justified (2007: 8). Here, the authors evidently follow Max Weber, who famously 
analyzed the role of the protestant work ethic in the development of capitalism (cf. We-
ber 2001). In view of the economic transformations in the age of globalization and neo-
liberalism, Boltanski and Chiapello have conceptualized a new spirit of capitalism, claim-
ing that what legitimizes capitalism today is not religion, but, rather, capitalism’s pro-
pensity to absorb and incorporate aspects of the critique of capitalism.8 A similar argu-
ment is made by Jim McGuigan in his book on Cool Capitalism, which he defines as “the 
incorporation, and thereby neutralization of cultural criticism and anti-capitalism into 
the theory and practice of capitalism itself” (2009: 38).9 
So the crucial question about whether or not parts of Deleuze’s philosophy might 
serve as ingredients of capitalist ideology is precisely related to capitalism’s ability to in-
corporate aspects of anti-capitalist critique. The question, then, is not whether Deleuze’s 
philosophy is essentially pro- or anti-capitalist, but whether it is able to resist this type 
of incorporation, based on the political and philosophical coordinates, the conceptual 
priorities, premises, dualisms, and qualifications that are essential for Deleuze’s image of 
thought. What Boltanski and Chiapello argue in this respect is that the type of philosoph-
ical critique that developed in France around 1968 was initially designed as a critique of 
                                                        
8 For instance, Boltanski and Chiapello note that the management literature of the 1990s in many ways 
echoes “the denunciations of hierarchy and aspirations to autonomy that were insistently expressed at the 
end of the 1960s and in the 1970s.” Therefore, “the qualities that are guarantees of success in this new 
spirit – autonomy, spontaneity, rhizomorphous capacity, multitasking (in contrast to the narrow speciali-
zation of the old division of labour), conviviality, openness to others and novelty, availability, creativity, 
visionary intuition, sensitivity to differences, listening to lived experience and receptiveness to a whole 
range of experiences, being attracted to informality and the search for interpersonal contacts – these are 
taken directly from the repertoire of May 1968” (2007: 97). As Boltanski and Chiapello thus argue, it is es-
pecially the version of critique they term ‘artistic critique’ (as opposed to ‘social critique’) that has been 
absorbed by the new spirit of capitalism. On the distinction between the two forms, cf. 2007: 36-40. 
9 On ‘cool capitalism’ and its affective logic, cf. also Schleusener 2014. 
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capitalism but – in its attack on tradition, authority, hierarchy, the state apparatus, the 
bourgeois family, and generally the idea of linear, fixed, or seemingly immobile struc-
tures – easily became assimilated into neoliberal discourse and its own critique of bu-
reaucracy, state planning, government regulation, social security, and fixed or settled 
types of subjectivity. Somewhat clumsily, Nigel Thrift sums up the argument as follows: 
“As Boltanski and Chiapello […] have noted, there are clear homologies between the cur-
rent Anglo-Saxon ideologies of capitalism and the writings of Derrida, Deleuze and 
Serres. They both set out a new moral plan based, in part, on the affective and the ludic, 
they both produce new figures of immanence (for example, the network), and they both 
attempt to produce new practices which are resolutely inauthentic” (2005: 4). 
 
From Anti-Oedipus to A Thousand Plateaus 
 
In what follows, I seek to take a more detailed look at Deleuze’s writings in order to 
evaluate to what extent the above-mentioned critique is justified. I will start with a 
quote from Anti-Oedipus that is frequently used as an example of Deleuze’s supposedly 
‘accelerationist’ attitude toward capitalism. Here is what Deleuze and Guattari write:  
 
But which is the revolutionary path? […] To withdraw from the world market, as 
Samir Amin advises Third World countries to do, in a curious revival of the fascist 
‘economic solution’? Or might it be to go in the opposite direction? To go still fur-
ther, that is, in the movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialization? 
For perhaps the flows are not yet deterritorialized enough, not decoded enough, 
from the viewpoint of a theory and a practice of a highly schizophrenic character. 
Not to withdraw from the process, but to go further, to ‘accelerate the process’, as 
Nietzsche put it. (2000: 239-40)    
To be sure, there are a number of different ways of how one can read this passage, 
which, on the one hand, has been interpreted as an example of Deleuze’s romanticization 
of capitalism, and, on the other, has become something of an emblematic quote for those 
critics of capitalism who self-identify as ‘accelerationists.’10 While I generally agree with 
Steven Shaviro, who has convincingly argued that the passage has “been taken out of 
context and interpreted much more broadly than Deleuze and Guattari ever intended” 
(2015: 13), I nevertheless think that it says a lot about the whole context of Deleuze’s 
critique of capitalism that comes to the fore in Anti-Oedipus, and which, to a large extent, 
is based on his reading of Nietzsche. Despite its various merits, I would argue that the 
                                                        
10 With regard to ‘accelerationism,’ the question of how to qualify the passage is of course further compli-
cated by the fact that one can distinguish between a ‘left-wing’ (cf. Srnicek/Williams 2015) and a ‘right-
wing’ (cf. Land 2011) version of accelerationism. For a general introduction to the various strands of ac-
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type of critique Deleuze developed during those years can hardly be said to already con-
sider the emerging forces of neoliberalism, and still less to serve as an adequate instru-
ment to counter these forces. While it is clear that the program of Anti-Oedipus is prem-
ised on a critique of capitalism, the book simultaneously affirms its deterritorializing 
tendency – a theme which had already been taken up by the economist Joseph Schum-
peter, who popularized the notion of ‘creative destruction’ as part of his theory of eco-
nomic innovation (cf. Schumpeter 1954).11 Seen in this context, it is not hard to imagine 
that neoliberals could easily embrace the above-quoted passage, in the sense that what 
is criticized here is not capitalism’s deterritorializing, accelerationist propensity (which 
has become all the more visible since the rise of neoliberalism), but that it functions, 
simultaneously, as a force of reterritorialization: “Capitalism,” Deleuze and Guattari 
write, “institutes or restores all sorts of residual and artificial, imaginary, or symbolic 
territorialities […]. Everything returns or recurs: States, nations, families” (2000: 34). In 
passages like these, it becomes rather clear that, at least in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and 
Guattari favor deterritorialization over reterritorialization, the forces of movement over 
those of stasis. Consequently, they understand the capitalist process as a “twofold 
movement of decoding or deterritorializing flows on the one hand, and their violent and 
artificial reterritorialization on the other” (2000: 34). 
This constellation, I believe, in many ways resonates with Deleuze’s take on Nie-
tzsche and, in particular, with his understanding of pastoral power and the latter’s dis-
tinction between active and reactive forces. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, for instance, 
Deleuze sees the power of the priest in his capacity to transform active into reactive 
forces, thereby decreasing the power of acting – understood in Spinozist terms12 – of the 
subject he controls (cf. Deleuze 1983). Power (in the sense of rule or domination) is thus 
basically conceptualized as a procedure of obstruction and “affective limitation” (Mas-
sumi 2015: 31) here. In the context of neoliberalism, however (as Foucault and others 
have pointed out), power typically relies on procedures of stimulation, activation, and 
incentive – a theme which Deleuze picked up much later, and which manifests itself 
most clearly in his ‘Control Societies’ essay. In the 1960s, however, the context was yet 
very different. In fact, the critique of power that Deleuze develops with reference to Nie-
                                                        
11 Strictly speaking, this whole train of thought can be said to have its roots in the Communist Manifesto. Cf. 
Marx/Engels 2002: 223: “Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social 
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All 
fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept 
away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all 
that is holy is profaned.” 
12 Cf. Spinoza 1996: 70: “By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting 
is increased or diminished, aided or restrained.” Along with Nietzsche, Spinoza and his ‘pragmatic’ concep-
tion of the body’s capacities – their reliance on processes of affection – has been a seminal influence on 
Deleuze’s thinking and, in particular, his conceptualization of a ‘micropolitics of desire’ or ‘politics of af-
fect’ (cf. Deleuze 1988 and 1992). For more on this, cf. Schleusener 2015 (especially 52-66, 100-06, and 
198-210) and Małecki/Schleusener 2015.  
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tzsche is designed to mark the modern sovereign as a ‘triumphant slave,’ who functions 
as the servant of established values. “Nietzsche describes modern states as ant colonies”, 
Deleuze writes, “where the leaders and the powerful win through their baseness, 
through the contagion of this baseness and this buffoonery” (2001: 76). By reactualizing 
Nietzschean ideas, Deleuze thus attacks a faceless and essentially bureaucratic type of 
power that operates on the basis of a generalized conformity (the masters here are seen 
as “leaders” in an “ant colony”). Generally, this critique is fairly compatible with the neo-
liberal critique of conformity, bureaucracy, and traditionalist hierarchy, while it is hard-
ly adequate to capture the more flexible types of governmentality that we encounter in 
the context of today’s capitalism. 
Considered from this angle, it is not difficult to contend that some of the critics 
quoted earlier do indeed have a point. Insofar as their critique is directed against 
Deleuze himself, however – and not against his contemporary adherents or against im-
proper kinds of appropriation – it might, in some sense, seem belated. For as I intend to 
demonstrate, Deleuze’s diagnosis and critique of capitalism is not a static one but devel-
ops in accordance with the unfolding of historical forces and events. Hence, my intention 
is not to attack Deleuze’s philosophy but, rather, to more adequately historicize it. 
Among other things, what this procedure reveals are the difficulties in approaching 
Deleuze’s work as a unified set of ideas and principles (like an always suitable ‘toolbox’), 
without taking account of the actual problems and contexts that led to their creation. In-
deed, it is my sense that by the late 1970s and early 1980s, Deleuze had started to de-
velop an awareness of the phenomenon we now call ‘neoliberalism,’ something which 
turned out to pose a problem for his thinking. It would thus make sense to analyse the 
shift from Anti-Oedipus (1972) to A Thousand Plateaus (1980) precisely against the 
backdrop of the onset of neoliberalism in the late 1970s. As David Harvey writes, “Fu-
ture historians may well look upon the years 1978–80 as a revolutionary turning-point 
in the world’s social and economic history” (2007: 1).13 It is interesting, in this respect, 
that hardly anyone has so far investigated the way in which Deleuze and Guattari’s ap-
proach changed from Anti-Oedipus to A Thousand Plateaus in this specific context. Yet, 
there are a number of notable dimensions in which A Thousand Plateaus can be said to 
differ from Anti-Oedipus. One aspect that is fairly obvious is that in A Thousand Plateaus 
there seems to be a “more cautious and sober tone”, as Eugene Holland writes, while 
“the revolutionary enthusiasm of Anti-Oedipus appears to be dampened” (1999: ix). My 
claim is that it is worthwhile to situate this shift in the context of the emergence of neo-
liberalism. 
                                                        
13 What Harvey refers to here is Deng Xiaoping’s effort to liberalize the Chinese economy, Paul Volcker’s 
appointment as chairman of the Federal Reserve, and the elections of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald 
Reagan, who first systematically implemented neoliberal policies in Great Britain and the USA. 
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What is significant in this regard is the fact that, as sociologists like Richard Sennett 
or Hartmut Rosa have shown, the culture of neoliberalism is effectively marked by a 
substantial acceleration of traditional temporal structures (cf. Rosa 2015) and a turn 
toward more and more flexibility in all aspects of social life (cf. Sennett 1999). Under the 
conditions of global capitalism, mobility thus seems to have lost its cultural value as a 
means to escape from repressive social assemblages and overstep rigid boundaries, 
since mobility itself has become the general rule to which almost anyone now has to 
conform. This shift, I argue, becomes visible if we look carefully at how Deleuze and 
Guattari reflect about mobility in A Thousand Plateaus. Of course, as the book developed 
over a period of many years, it would be inappropriate to interpret it unilaterally as per-
forming a clear break with the ideas articulated in Anti-Oedipus. My point, therefore, is a 
more modest one. What I argue is simply that A Thousand Plateaus contains various 
traces of a new sensibility that can be related to the changed socioeconomic context, es-
pecially with regard to the phenomenon of mobility. For instance, in terms of their no-
tion of the line of flight, Deleuze and Guattari now state that there always is the danger 
that the line of flight might mutate into “a line of pure destruction and abolition” (2004: 
254). Furthermore, there is a similar statement on the distinction between smooth and 
striated space: “In the aftermath of striation”, Deleuze and Guattari write,  
the sea reimparts a kind of smooth space, occupied first by the ‘fleet in being,’ then 
by the perpetual motion of the strategic submarine, which outflanks all gridding 
and invents a neonomadism in the service of a war machine still more disturbing 
than the States […]. The sea, then the air and the stratosphere, become smooth 
spaces again, but in the strangest of reversals. (2004: 530) 
 
Now, what is striking about these and similar passages is that the whole idea of flight 
and mobility – deterritorialization, the smooth space, and the line of flight – is not quali-
fied as exclusively affirmative or positive anymore. Of course, statements as the one cit-
ed above are not direct comments about neoliberalism or the new capitalism. But by re-
ferring to a “neonomadism in the service of a war machine still more disturbing than the 
States,” it seems obvious that some of the conceptual coordinates of Deleuze and Guat-
tari have significantly shifted. And with regard to the general context of neoliberalism 
and globalization, it is not a coincidence that these shifts explicitly touch upon aspects 
like mobility, global space, and sovereignty beyond the limits of the nation-state (cf. 
Schleusener 2011). 
 
The Society of Control 
However, it is perhaps not until his “Postscript on Control Societies” published in 1990 – 
and a few passages in the late 1980s, where he already refers to the control paradigm 
(cf. Deleuze 2007: 326-27) – that Deleuze ‘directly’ (though without ever using the term) 
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analyzes and attacks neoliberalism. The point of departure in Deleuze’s essay is Fou-
cault’s conception of the ‘disciplinary society,’ which, as he explains, was superseded by 
the new regime of control after World War II. This shift, he argues, corresponds with a 
significant “mutation of capitalism” (1995: 180) and is informed by a general “break-
down of all sites of confinement – prisons, hospitals, factories, schools, the family” 
(1995: 178).14 The disintegration of these institutions gives rise to new forms of control, 
whose mode of operation manifests itself as a continuous ‘modulation.’ Here, Deleuze 
mentions the example of wages: “the factory”, he writes, “was a body of men whose in-
ternal forces reached an equilibrium between the highest possible production and the 
lowest possible wages; but in a control society, businesses take over from factories,” 
striving “to introduce a deeper level of modulation into all wages,” “an inexorable rivalry 
presented as healthy competition” (1995: 179). Hence, while the ‘factory’ can be under-
stood as embodying the type of organization and rule among disciplinary societies, the 
‘business’ serves as the model for post-disciplinary societies, whose socioeconomic con-
text is the post-Fordist mode of production and the neoliberal accumulation regime. 
Analogous to Sennett’s ‘flexible subject’ (cf. Sennett 1999), Deleuze thus portrays the in-
dividual in control societies as wavelike and ‘dividual,’ being not only the object of a con-
stant modulation, but also constantly involved in a kind of self-modulation. “We've gone 
from one animal to the other,” Deleuze states,  
from moles to snakes, not just in the system we live under but in the way we live 
and in our relations with other people too. Disciplinary man produced energy in 
discrete amounts, while control man undulates, moving among a continuous range 
of different Orbits. Surfing has taken over from all the old sports. (1995: 180) 
What we can see, then, is how much Deleuze’s understanding of power has shifted from 
his Nietzschean take on the power of the priest. While his earlier conception was prem-
ised on an understanding of power as (affective) inhibition and obstruction, power is 
now – in line with the demands of the ‘new capitalism’ (Sennett 2006) – a force that 
modulates and mobilizes, activates and incentivizes. Along these lines, Deleuze’s qualifi-
cation of mobility seems to have become significantly more balanced, diverging from the 
mostly affirmative attitude present in his earlier work with Guattari.15  
 For Deleuze, the Postscript therefore also provides an opportunity to reassess, mod-
ify, and rewrite his own philosophy.16 Above all, this concerns the notion of the ‘nomadic 
                                                        
14 In view of the massive rise in incarceration rates from the 1980s onward (particularly in the US and in 
Europe), this account is at least questionable with regard to the prison. Cf., for example, Wacquant 2009. 
15 With regard to the example of freeways, this somewhat more sober look at mobility is also underlined in 
“What is the Creative Act?” (a lecture given in 1987): “Control is not discipline. You do not confine people 
with a highway. But by making highways, you multiply the means of control. I am not saying this is the on-
ly aim of highways, but people can travel infinitely and ‘freely’ without being confined while being perfect-
ly controlled. That is our future” (Deleuze 2007: 327). 
16 On this idea, cf. also Benjamin Noys’ article in this special issue. In the first volume, a similar argument is 
made by Andrew Culp with regard to the relationship between Deleuze and cybernetics (cf. Culp 2020). 
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subject,’ which once was celebrated by Deleuze, and even more so by his followers (cf. 
Braidotti 1994). Now, in the guise of the all-too-flexible ‘snake,’ it has become a concep-
tual persona that represents, rather than undermines, the new cultural imperative and 
economic status quo.17 Similarly, the Postscript rewrites a number of other Deleuzian 
concepts too. A case in point is the notion of the ‘dividual,’ which, as Michaela Ott has 
highlighted, Deleuze used affirmatively in his cinema books (cf. Deleuze 1986 and 1989) 
“to accentuate the constant changes in framing proper to certain films, whose portrayal 
of ever changing audiovisual elements and ambiguous expression of affect cannot be 
called individual” (2018: 35). In the Postscript, however, Deleuze’s use of the concept is 
decidedly more “gloomy” (Ott 2018: 137), as it now refers to the snakelike flexibility of 
the actors and ‘entreployees’ (Pongratz/Voß 2003) in neoliberal control societies: 
“We’re no longer dealing with a duality of mass and individual. Individuals become 
‘dividuals’ and masses become samples, data, markets, or ‘banks’” (Deleuze 1995: 180).18 
Lastly, a comparable conceptual transformation can be identified with regard to the 
shifting connotations of the notion of the ‘password’ (or mot de passe). In A Thousand 
Plateaus, the term was used to point out an alternative to the so-called ‘order-word’ (or 
mot d’ordre), any word or statement that prompts a particular action based on a “social 
obligation”: “Every statement displays this link, directly or indirectly. Questions, prom-
ises, are order-words” (Deleuze/Guattari 2004: 87). Yet, Deleuze and Guattari also out-
line the possibility of turning ‘order-words’ into ‘passwords’ and thereby allowing for a 
passage or transition: 
 
There are pass-words beneath order-words. Words that pass, words that are com-
ponents of passage, whereas order-words mark stoppages or organized, stratified 
compositions. A single thing or word undoubtedly has this twofold nature: it is 
necessary to extract one from the other – to transform the compositions of order 
into components of passage. (2004: 122) 
                                                        
17 The figure of the snake is undoubtedly a rewarding metaphor in this context, as it not only embodies 
neoliberalism’s cultural ideal of ultimate flexibility, but also refers to the European Union’s former “Ex-
change Rate Mechanism,” in which currencies were “allowed to vary in value or ‘float’ within limits set by 
their notional rate against a weighted basket of other participating currencies” (Deleuze 1995: 203; Trans-
lator’s Notes). 
18 For more on the argument that Deleuze’s notion of the dividual changed from his cinema books to the 
Postscript, cf. Ott 2018: 136: “In ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control,’ Deleuze assigns a historical date to 
becoming-dividual, equating its emergence with the media technology transition from analogue to digital, 
from the disciplinary system of territorial and systematically demarcated units to the control system of a 
technological and finance-capital-occasioned continuum of inseparable modulations and self-transfor-
mations. […] It appears almost as though Deleuze now experiences his affirmation of temporality and 
transformation as a curse. After all, he complains that, in opposition to analogue systems that set up mi-
lieus largely independent of one another – even if they seek to adapt to one another in line with an over-
arching norm – in the digital system, everything connects with, and is translatable into and computable 
with, everything else” (translation slightly modified). 
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Now, in the Postscript, the understanding of the term has significantly shifted. Here, 
Deleuze argues that, different from the disciplinary society, in control societies “the key 
thing is no longer a signature or number but a code: codes are passwords, whereas disci-
plinary societies are ruled (when it comes to integration or resistance) by precepts.19 
The digital language of control is made up of codes indicating whether access to some in-
formation should be allowed or denied” (1995: 180). As the ‘password’ is now fully inte-
grated into the linguistic infrastructure of the regime of control, all associations with a 
potentially empowering conception of ‘passage’ or the ‘line of flight’ – which the term 
still carried in A Thousand Plateaus – seem to have disappeared. As Andrew Ballantyne 
puts it: “we slide from a world controlled by mots d’ordre, to one controlled by mots de 
passe – from commands to permissions – and the world restructures itself around us” 
(2005: 246). 
 The Postscript, however, not only delineates a changed socioeconomic and political 
reality. It also signals a new direction in Deleuze’s philosophy, one that, rather late in his 
life, he did not have the opportunity – or aspiration – to more fully develop. It would per-
haps be too much to claim that his way of furtively modifying his concepts and ideas in 
the Postscript amounts to a full-blown ‘self-criticism’ (cf. Althusser 1976), a ritual he 
undoubtedly despised. Yet, if we read the few pages of the essay carefully, what we dis-
cover is a cautious adjustment of his philosophy to a changed historical reality. In a 
sense, it might even seem as though what he presents in this short text is a preemptive, 




What I hope to have demonstrated in this essay is that it is worthwhile to analyze the 
way in which Deleuze modified parts of his philosophy against the backdrop of socioec-
onomic history and, in particular, the development of neoliberal capitalism. While it 
would be easy to retroactively accuse Deleuze of his philosophy’s ‘complicity’ with a 
number of aspects of neoliberalism’s cultural ideal, this would also be rather pointless. 
In any case, such criticism would have more in common with the sort of ‘presentist’ 
moralizing existing among some circles of ‘woke’ activists than with the idea of historici-
zation in Jameson’s sense (cf. Jameson 2002). For what should count here is not the 
                                                        
19 ‘Precept’ here is simply a different translation of the French mot d’ordre. 
20 It is also worth noting here that Deleuze explicitly stated his repugnance at how some of his (and Guat-
tari’s) concepts were taken up by a certain ‘Deleuzism’ that evolved after the publication of A Thousand 
Plateaus. In a 1983 letter to Joseph Emmanuel Voeffray, for instance, Deleuze writes: “Notions like ‘rhi-
zome’ or ‘becoming-animal’ had enough impact for people to use them in a way that defies all logic and in 
a way that disgusts Félix and me. It is very odd. I sometimes feel like I’m being roasted by idiotic parasites” 
(Deleuze 2020: 91). 
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philosophical or political ‘purity’ of Deleuze’s thinking but, rather, the question of which 
aspects of his work are still relevant for thinking and conceptualizing the world we cur-
rently live in – a world that has been significantly transformed since the “neoliberal rev-
olution” (Harvey 2007: 39) of the late 1970s and 1980s.21 While I do not doubt that a 
wholesale affirmation of all aspects of Deleuzian philosophy would be (to say the least) 
politically counterproductive in this context, I hope to have also shown that many of his 
ideas, especially those articulated in the Postscript, are still very relevant, even though 
his reflections about the society of control are by now thirty years old.      
 While my task was primarily to contribute to a better understanding of the relation-
ship between Deleuze and neoliberalism, another, more general aspect of my essay was 
to show how Deleuze’s philosophy is not a unified body of abstract philosophical con-
cepts and principles, but that it makes sense to historicize its development. Along similar 
lines, Deleuze himself has stated that one needs to apprehend the philosophical creation 
of concepts as not just a practice of truth-seeking, but in the sense that concepts always 
offer solutions to problems which need to be perceived and, as it were, ‘constructed’ in 
the first place, and which “necessarily change” over time (Deleuze/Guattari 1994: 28).22 
On that note, Deleuze’s remark in the Postscript that “It’s not a question of worrying or 
of hoping for the best, but of finding new weapons” (1995: 178) is significant in two dis-
tinct ways. On the one hand, Deleuze demonstrates that the rise of neoliberalism must 
be understood as a development that poses new types of problems which demand new 
responses and new forms of critique. On the other hand, however, this can also be read 
as a statement about his take on philosophy in general, whose task always is to ‘find new 
weapons,’ that is, new instruments of analysis and critique. The effectiveness of a phi-
losophy, then, not only concerns the way in which it presents itself as a coherent body of 
abstract ideas and ontological principles, because what is at least as important is its di-
agnostic and pragmatic dimension: its effectiveness in terms of its ability to make visi-
ble, relate and provide answers to, contemporary problems. In other words, the task of 
philosophy is not to solve the problems of the past, but to create concepts that are able 
                                                        
21 Of course, another thing that would be of great significance is a thorough analysis of the success of the 
whole intellectual formation that came to prominence after 1968, in the general context of poststructural-
ism or postmodernism. While it would be a simplification to categorically see these intellectual currents – 
along with today’s ‘postcritique’ (cf. Felski 2015) – in the service of capitalist or neoliberal ideology, it 
would nevertheless be worthwhile to systematically analyze and rethink the marginalization of Marxist 
theory and the concept of class during these years, within the left and the intellectual scene as a whole. 
Especially since the financial crisis of 2008 and the following ‘debt crisis’ in Europe (cf. Mirowski 2013 
and Blyth 2013), but also in the context of the rise of rightwing populism (cf. Mouffe 2018) or current dis-
cussions about climate change (cf. Klein 2014) and the Anthropocene (cf. Moore 2016), it seems that the 
academic status quo is to at least some extent changing. 
22 “A concept always has the truth that falls to it as a function of the conditions of its creation. […] If one 
can still be a Platonist, Cartesian, or Kantian today, it is because one is justified in thinking that their con-
cepts can be reactivated in our problems and inspire those concepts that need to be created. What is the 
best way to follow the great philosophers? Is it to repeat what they said or to do what they did, that is, cre-
ate concepts for problems that necessarily change?” (Deleuze/Guattari 1994: 27-28) 
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to intervene in the problems of the present, that is (in more proper Deleuzian terms), 
“the now of our becoming” (Deleuze/Guattari 1994: 112). 
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